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Abstract 
 Metamemory develops early in childhood with language, but may be impaired in 
disorders like autism spectrum disorders. Because of its strong links to language, most attempts 
to measure metamemory have relied strongly on communicative ability. This study reports on a 
task that nonverbally assesses metamemory. This novel task modified the delayed-match-to-
sample paradigm where the participant chooses a matching response to an initial stimulus. The 
modification lets the participant review the original stimulus if they are unsure of their answer, 
allowing for a nonverbal assessment of metamemory. The task is correlated with a current 
measure of verbal metamemory. Also given strong face validity, the task is an appropriate 
alternative for the measurement of metamemory. The task was not correlated with a measure of 
autism-like traits, while a more verbal measure of verbal metamemory was negatively correlated 
with autism-like traits, suggesting those with these traits may show deficits on verbal measures 
only.   
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Nonverbal Measurement of Metamemory and its Relation to Autism Traits 
Metacognition is the understanding and awareness of one’s own cognition. One aspect of 
metacognitive ability is the knowledge of one’s own memory capabilities; this awareness is 
called metamemory (Bordignon, Endres, Trentini & Bosa, 2015). Metamemory emerges in early 
childhood in typically developing (TD) children, but may be delayed in certain developmental 
disorders such as autism spectrum disorders (ASD). Metamemory is crucial in daily living, in 
that we often assess our capability to remember how to carry out tasks, and make judgements as 
to whether we need memory aides or not. We may also need to review or revisit information 
often in order to bolster our memory. However, our current understanding of metamemory is 
drastically limited by its dependence on language (Ebert, 2015). All measures assessing human 
metamemory known to the author use verbal or written approaches. It may be the case in ASD, 
or other disorders affecting language, that observed deficits in metamemory are due partially, or 
in whole to issues with language expression (i.e. these participants may find it difficult to put 
into words the complex task of expressing self-awareness). For this reason, the development of a 
measure assessing metamemory through nonverbal means will deepen our understanding of this 
process and its connection to language.  
Language, Theory of Mind and Metamemory  
Theory of mind (TOM) is the knowledge and understanding of the mental states of others 
(Baron-Cohen, 1991). Language development, TOM, and metacognitive abilities are known to 
be correlated from a very young age (Fritz, Howie, & Kleitman, 2010). The development of 
language may also signal, or otherwise influence, the development of a wide range of mental 
abstraction abilities, including metacognition and TOM (Borkowski, Ryan, Kurtz & Reid, 1983). 
Lockl and Schneider (2007) found that language abilities at ages typically before the 
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development of metamemory (3 - 5 years old) were able to predict metamemory abilities at a 
later age. Similarly, early language abilities predict TOM later in development, but early TOM 
did not predict language ability (Astington & Jenkins, 1999). It is difficult to know whether this 
pattern would also hold for metacognitive abilities but the link between theory of mind and 
metacognition is well supported in literature (Flavell, 2000; Misailidi, 2010) and some advocate 
that the two should be subsumed into a larger category called meta-knowing (Kuhn, 2000). 
However, since both of these abilities are measured almost entirely with verbal measures, it is 
likely that a certain amount of verbal ability is required to demonstrate “meta-knowing”.  
Meta-knowing and language are both implicated as areas of potential deficit in ASD; 
however, the relationship between language and metacognition, specifically metamemory, is not 
well established since most measures of metamemory rely heavily on participants being able to 
express complex and abstract ideas about the inner states. I will turn to the literature looking at 
ASD, metamemory, and language and highlight conceptual gaps. Then based on comparative 
cognition research, I propose a new experimental task that allows for the study of metamemory 
without requiring expressive language.  
Research conducted in the area of metamemory and language in ASD is equivocal. Some 
researchers limit the sample of ASD participants in their studies to only those without a language 
delay. Other groups typically study high-functioning children on the spectrum; however, children 
with ASD who are high-functioning may be able to compensate for language deficits. Because of 
this, some studies that have matched for language abilities detect no deficits in the verbal 
measurement of metamemory (e.g. Farrant, 1999).  
Some research groups have found inconsistent results when testing different samples of 
children with ASD.  Wojcik, Allen, Brown and Souchay (2011) used confidence judgements 
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(participants must indicate how confident they are in their memory) and the accuracy of these 
judgements to assess metamemory. After being asked to sort items in a memory task, participants 
were asked to rate how well they thought they did on a task on a 10-point scale. However, the 
ASD sample for this study (16 children) consisted of seven children diagnosed with Asperger’s 
syndrome and nine with high-functioning autism. Before the incorporation of Asperger’s 
syndrome inside of autism spectrum disorders in the current edition of the DSM, it was regarded 
as distinct in terms of more preserved language abilities while sharing similarities in social skill 
abilities and stereotyped behaviors (Glennon, 2001). The mean IQ of the children in sample used 
by Wojcik and colleagues (2011) was 112.19. While the typically developing controls used in 
this study were IQ matched (118.50), issues might arise from only looking at the high-IQ end of 
the ASD spectrum or a sample consisting of children with Asperger’s syndrome. That is, well-
developed language in these children may mask metamemory deficits if they exist in the high-
functioning end of the autism spectrum. Indeed, in this study, they did not find differences from 
TD groups in metamemory ability.  
However, in a later study that did not match for verbal mental age or restrict the sample 
to children with high-functioning autism, the researchers found differences in some types of 
metamemory (Wojcik, Moulin & Sousay, 2013). Similarly, other groups have found deficits 
when using similar samples (Grainger, Williams & Lind 2014). If language develops alongside 
metamemory as Lockl and Schneider (2007) suggested, in studies where children with ASD lag 
behind typically developing peers in terms of language, it is difficult to know whether 
metamemory is a deficit in ASD independent of language deficits, when metamemory has been 
evaluated using language-based measures.    
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Memory strategy use may also be related to the joint development of metamemory and 
language. Children, when beginning to rehearse items to remember, often repeat words in their 
mind (Harris, 2000). Cantor, Andreassen and Waters (1985) found that verbal memory strategy 
use was associated with the development of metamemory abilities in children. Among children 
in kindergarten, Grade 2 and Grade 5, there was a linear trend in the development of both 
metamemory and language, as is expected. However, within the groups, the children with the 
highest metamemory abilities (i.e. knowing when to use a memory strategy) were best able to 
express themselves. Among the children who were younger (kindergarten and grade 2) but had 
high metamemory abilities, their language skills still trailed older children with similar 
metamemory abilities, indicating that language abilities might possibly trail metamemory. 
Similarly, Bebko, McMorris, Metcalfe, Ricciuti and Goldstein (2014) found that language 
proficiency mediated metamemory’s influence on tasks of recall. Other longitudinal research 
indicates that language indirectly impacts the development of metamemory (Ebert, 2015). 
However, since these studies have used measures of metamemory that rely upon children 
describing their inner states, and require the use of abstract language, it may be that exploration 
of metamemory has been intertwined with verbal skills. It is important to determine whether 
metamemory skills can be examined separately from language development.  
Nonverbal Metamemory 
           Assessing metamemory nonverbally in humans has been attempted before, but many of 
the tests used still had a verbal component. In order to measure metamemory in very young 
children (aged 4 to 5), Henry and Norman (1996) attempted to convert a metamemory 
questionnaire (Wellman, 1997) into a set of pictures depicting situations. For example, in one set 
there would be two pictures: one in which a child has a thought bubble with three items in it and 
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another with a child with a thought bubble that has seven items in it. However, the final part of 
the questionnaire remained verbal and the experimenter would ask the child in which picture it 
would be easier for the child to remember the set. To the best of my knowledge, no attempt has 
been made to attempt to assess metamemory nonverbally in children on the autism spectrum. 
Researchers examining areas such as Alzheimer’s disease and other dementias have tried to 
develop objective metamemory measures, but these tasks still require participants to verbally 
explain their memory (e.g. Cosentino, Metcalfe, Butterfield & Stern, 2007; Shaked et al., 2014). 
Comparative Cognition 
            Another approach that has been taken in assessing metamemory is the use of animal 
models. Since animals cannot speak, the only way they can show metamemory ability is 
behaviorally. Most animal studies have looked at metamemory either as a part of metacognition, 
in order to place phylogenetically where metacognition evolved, or in order to assess the 
animals’ own abilities (Smith, Shields & Washburn, 2003). These approaches, if they 
successfully assess metamemory in animals, may be adapted in order to assess metamemory 
nonverbally in humans. Bebko and colleagues (2014) suggest that the apparent lack of 
improvement in metamemory skills in children with ASD (despite training in the use of 
strategies) may be due to the lack of an appropriate measure for metamemory. They suggest 
turning to the animal literature, from which I’ll briefly review the most promising directions in 
metamemory research.  
 Animal research in metamemory has ranged from studies on animals such as pigeons to 
monkeys and apes. Many of the following animal studies use a delayed matching to sample task 
(e.g. Inman & Shettleworth, 1999). These studies consist of showing the subjects (in these cases, 
an animal) a stimulus, followed by a delay. After the delay, the participant has to choose the 
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stimulus seen earlier from among a set of response stimuli (in animals such as birds, they are 
trained to peck the responses). Pigeons may be a surprising candidate for possessing 
metamemory abilities, and indeed the results are tenuous at best and highly debated.   
Inman and Shettleworth (1999) trained pigeons on a delayed matching to sample task 
with a 6 pellet food reward for pecking the correct button; for choosing an incorrect option, they 
would get no pellets. After training the pigeons on these contingencies, the experimenters made 
available another option that appeared alongside the other possible response buttons – a 
relatively less risky option (called the “safe option”), where the pigeons could choose another 
response that would offer a much smaller reward than choosing the correct option.  The pigeons 
chose this option on trials that had lengthy delays or if there were many possible responses in the 
response set (i.e. on those trials that were the most difficult). This might have indicated 
metamemory abilities but the authors themselves acknowledged other, more likely explanations.  
A follow up study had the same paradigm, but the pellet reward amounts were varied 
(Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008). For example, in one variation, choosing the third option (that 
always resulted in a smaller reward than the correct option), the pigeons were rewarded with five 
pellets compared to six for the correct one. In short, it would almost always have been beneficial 
to choose the safe option in this scenario, rather than risk choosing an incorrect option since the 
reward for this option was almost identical to the reward for choosing the correct response. 
However, like in the first paradigm, the pigeons continued to choose the third option only when 
delays were long, revealing that associations likely persisted from earlier training, and that 
various stimulus options were associated with varying delays. In this instance, it was likely that 
the pigeons were using associative learning to decide when to use the safe option, rather than 
demonstrating their metamemory.  
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 A similar task was used to study metamemory in crows (Goto & Watanabe, 2012). The 
authors used 2 kinds of delayed matching to sample tasks. In the first task, there was a start 
signal followed by a study phase, where the crow could look at a stimulus to be remembered, 
followed by a delay (varying between 1 and 32 seconds). After the delay, there was the choice 
phase where the crow had to indicate (by peck) whether to see the test phase (where the crow 
would have to select the stimulus that matched the one presented earlier from a set of other 
stimuli) or to “opt out” and get a smaller reward. They called this the “prospective metamemory 
task” since the crow had to make a choice before seeing the test phase (i.e before seeing the 
response stimuli), whether to begin the phase or to opt out and get the smaller reward (making 
the choice before seeing the response stimuli means the crows would make a prospective 
“judgement” about their knowledge of their own memory).  
Goto and Watanabe (2012) also had another condition where the crows could see the 
options in the test phase, select an answer, and then indicate whether they would “continue” or 
“opt out”, which was called the retrospective memory task (since the crows had already seen the 
test stimuli). This almost acted as a confidence judgement (Smith et al., 2003). In order to ensure 
that any results found in this manner would not be due to association, Goto and Watanabe (2012) 
added a clever twist. On some trials in both the prospective and retrospective and memory tasks, 
there would be no study phase. This meant the crows would see the start signal, immediately 
followed by the delay of varying lengths, which they named the “omission trials” since the initial 
stimulus presentation (the stimulus to be remembered) was omitted. Again in the prospective 
condition, the crows would have to choose whether or not to see the stimuli for responding. In 
the retrospective condition, they would choose their answer and then choose whether to opt out 
or not – a confidence judgement.  
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 Given the complete lack of information in these omission trials, someone monitoring 
their own memory would decide to opt out every time on an omission trial. The crows showed an 
interesting pattern. In prospective trials, the crows did not opt out at any different frequency on 
omission trials compared with regular trials that showed the initial stimulus (Goto & Watanabe, 
2012). Presumably, a being with a strong awareness of their memory would always opt out on an 
omission trial, since there was no initial stimulus presentation and thus it would be impossible to 
pick an appropriate answer from the response set. However, in the retrospective memory trials, 
the crows chose to escape significantly more often in the omission trials, regardless of the length 
of the delay. This indicates they might have had some awareness that they had not seen the 
stimulus in the test phase and thus were able to choose to escape despite any sort of association 
with delay length they might have developed.  
However, the question remains about why they were unable to monitor their memories in 
this manner in the prospective phase. The authors suggest that this may be due to the prospective 
memory task causing “uncertainty” before the opt out/do not opt out choice had been made. It 
may be a more difficult task to predict what happens next in the experimental task, compared to 
being aware that you had not seen any of the presented stimuli. It may be quite a while before we 
definitively decipher the cognitive abilities of animals, especially of those that are so far 
removed in phylogeny from humans. In contrast, animals such as primates have long been 
believed to have some metacognitive ability (Metcalfe, 2008). Abstraction abilities such as using 
symbols to communicate language have been observed occasionally (Lyn, Greenfield, Savage-
Rumbaugh, Gillespie-Lynch & Hopkins, 2011). Because primates are more related to humans 
phylogenetically, research done in this area may be more applicable in developing nonverbal 
measures of metamemory.  
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 Metamemory in primates. Several studies have looked at the metamemory capabilities 
of monkeys. Paradigms such as the delayed match to sample tasks with birds, described above, 
have also been used with monkeys (Tanaka & Funahashi, 2012). The monkeys were also able to 
complete the tasks successfully; however, as discussed above, this may be due to associative 
memory abilities. One popular paradigm that does not use the delayed matching to sample task, 
uses foraging behaviors to assess metamemory. Hampton, Zivin and Murray (2004) had four 
tubes that were completely opaque. On most trials, an experimenter would bait one tube with 
food without the monkey observing it. The monkey would then check all four tubes until it found 
the food. After it had learned this pattern, on some trials the monkey would be able to observe 
the experimenter bait the tube. The monkeys, on these trials, consistently went to and looked at 
the tube that they saw being baited first. However, unlike the authors’ initial claims, this may be 
explained as the use of a visual search strategy that incorporates the primates’ memory of what 
they had observed earlier without using any metamemory or metacognition (Hampton, 2009).  
 A more convincing demonstration of metamemory using monkeys utilized a modified 
version of the delayed match to sample task (Basile, Schroeder, Browm, Templar & Hampton, 
2015). Instead of an escape or opt-out option like the crow experiments had, the monkeys were 
given a “relearn” option; that is, they were allowed to see the stimulus again (and had to re-
experience the delay). There was no consequence for choosing the relearn option, other than 
having to experience the delay again before receiving their reward.   
As was the case with the pigeons, it was still possible that the monkeys were simply 
associating longer delays with choosing the relearn option. To account for this, the experimenters 
also used trials where there were more stimuli, thus making the task more difficult, but with a 
smaller delay.  An animal that had simply learned the association with longer delays would have 
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responded based on an association with the delay and not the number of response stimuli. The 
experimenters were very thorough and manipulated the delay, reward and the number of 
responses to choose from in order to ascertain whether the monkeys had associated any of these 
task characteristics (delay, reward, responses) with choosing the “relearn” option. The monkeys 
only chose to relearn when the task was difficult and not with any particular task characteristic, 
meaning they most likely had awareness of their memory.  The clever ways in which 
metamemory has been assessed in animals gives us insight into the next steps that might be taken 
with the assessment of metamemory in populations whose verbal abilities are or may be 
compromised.  
Research Goals and Hypotheses 
 The overall aim of this study was to develop a behavioral measure of nonverbal 
metamemory. Adapting the delayed match to sample (DMTS) tasks used in animals (Goto & 
Watanabe, 2012; Basile et al., 2015), the primary goal is to develop a valid measure of 
metamemory that can be administered without verbal instructions. Convergent validity was 
assessed based on participant responses on this task with established metamemory 
questionnaires. If successful, in future studies this measure can be used in populations such as 
those with ASD, young children with limited language, or elderly populations with 
metacognitive deficits (such as in Alzheimer’s dementia; for a review see Bertrand, Landeira-
Fernandez & Mograbi, 2016) to measure metamemory ability or gains in metamemory without 
relying on language. Since this experimental metamemory task is intended to be a nonverbal 
analogue of the verbal metamemory tasks, I hypothesized that nonverbal measurements of 
metamemory will share correlations with verbal measures of metamemory. However, given the 
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separation from language which may contribute to the variance seen in verbal measures, this 
relationship might be small to moderate.  
A secondary aim of the proposed study is to examine the relationship between 
metamemory measured nonverbally and autism-like traits present in a non-clinical sample. Since 
the literature on autism and metamemory is inconclusive (possibly because of confounding 
language ability as mentioned earlier), it is difficult to predict the relation to autism-like traits. 
However, given the general deficits of theory of mind in autism and how some researchers posit 
that both metamemory and theory of mind fall under one cognitive category of meta-knowing, I 
hypothesized there will be a negative correlation of autism-like traits with verbal measures of 
metamemory. These traits will be measured with a questionnaire designed to assess autism-like 
traits in a typical adult population.  
Finally, because this study will examine typically developing populations, participant 
responses on the verbal measures may be associated with language abilities. The nonverbal 
measurements, since they do not depend on language, should not be correlated to measures of 
language.  
Methods 
Participants 
43 participants were recruited from the undergraduate research participant pool (the 
URPP) at York University. Participants were between the ages of 17 and 39, and had normal to 
corrected vision. The mean age was 20.55 years (SD = 3.45). There were 24 females and 19 
males. All participants reported fluency in English.   
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Measures 
Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II; Wechsler, 2011). 
The WASI is an abbreviated test of intelligence, containing 4 subtests designed to provide an 
accurate measure of IQ for a typically developing population in between the ages of 6 and 90. 
This measure provides a verbal reasoning score, a performance score and a full-scale score of IQ 
and is relatively quick to administer (approximately 30 mins). For this study, I will use the 2-
subtest version of the WASI, which includes the Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests. 
Both the 2- and 4-subtest version are known to correlate well with other measures of intelligence 
and in this study the briefer form helped to prevent participant fatigue (McCrimmon & Smith, 
2013). 
The Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ; Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, Skinner, Martin & 
Clubley, 2001) is a 50-item questionnaire that can be completed in under 20 minutes. For this 
study, the 10 item short form of the AQ was used (Allison, Auyeung, & Baron-Cohen, 2012). 
The short form of the AQ has been demonstrated to be effective in screen for autism and in 
identifying the presence of autism-like traits (Sizoo et al., 2015). The AQ is a measure of autism-
like traits and was designed primarily as a screening tool for autism but has also been used by the 
test developers with non-ASD adult samples, such as university students, to identify the degree 
to which ASD-like characteristics are present in the general population. Participants were 
assigned of a score of “1” or “0” on each question (though some items are reverse scored) and a 
high score reflects the presence of more autism-like traits.  
The Expressive One-Word Picture Vocabulary test – Fourth Edition (EOWPVT-IV; 
Brownell, 2011) is a measure of verbal ability, specifically expressive vocabulary. Participants 
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named pictured items with one word in a series that becomes progressively more difficult. 
Participants are awarded a point for each word they correctly identify.  
         The Metamemory Inventory – (MMI; adapted from Flavell & Wellman, 1977; Bebko, 
Rhee, McMorris & Ncube, 2015) is a series of questions assessing participants’ knowledge of his 
or her own memory and to evaluate the usefulness of strategies such as categorization or 
rehearsal. Participants were asked whether certain groups of items from a set are easier to 
remember, how many stimuli they predict they can remember, and how they would remember 
difficult instructions, with points being awarded for answers that indicate metamemory 
knowledge. This measure is typically used with children, but since this study tested adults, we 
used a more difficult version of the MMI (i.e. participants were asked to predict how many 
words out of a set they will remember; in the child version, there were 8 words in the set, the 
adult version had 16 words in order to avoid ceiling effects). Participants were given points for 
their answers if they indicated evidence of metamemory as well as for correctly identifying the 
number of items they remembered (or for being close). The questionnaire is included in 
Appendix A.   
 Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire – (MMQ; Troyer & Rich, 2002) was a self-report 
measure of metamemory. For this study the How I Feel About my Memory subscale was used. 
This subscale consists of 18 items on a 5-point scale from “Strongly Agree” to “Strongly 
Disagree”. The measure is typically used with middle-aged or older adults to assess self-reported 
confidence in memory. The subscale used in this study is included in Appendix A.  
Delayed Matching to Sample – (DMTS; adapted from Goto & Watanabe, 2012) was used 
as the nonverbal behavioral measure of metamemory. In order to differentiate metamemory from 
language ability, a version of the DMTS task was adapted to assess metamemory nonverbally. 
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Since the task is novel, it will be described in detail here. The task operated like a simple game, 
where the participant had to choose the correct stimulus from a response set, with a correct 
choice rewarded with game coins. The task itself began with a fixation cross on a computer 
screen that depicted a forest environment, followed by a single stimulus to remember. 
Simultaneous with stimulus presentation, a small figure appeared on the screen carrying five 
coins in his hand (see Figure 1). After the stimulus disappeared, there were delays of varying 
length, where the screen would have the small figure running. The purpose was to keep the 
participant relatively engaged during the delays (compared to a purely black screen). The delay 
may be 2, 15, or 25 seconds long to vary the difficulty of remembering after the delay.   
After the delay, the figure stopped running and was able to “view” the response set which 
appeared on the screen. The participant was then able to use the mouse to choose the original 
stimulus out of a picture set of 4 or 8. The stimuli and the responses consist of geometric shapes 
(such as a pattern of squares or triangles) and other complex images (such as tessellations), and 
are similar to those used in other DMTS tasks (Goto & Watanabe, 2012; Sutton & Shettleworth, 
2008, etc.). The response items within sets had small differences among them, with minor 
elements changed (e.g. a square has a different size or is in a different location within the item). 
If the participant chose correctly, s/he was awarded the five game tokens/coins that the character 
in the game was carrying; an incorrect answer resulted in no coins. On testing trials, another 
option was present after the participant had made a choice and before feedback about accuracy 
was given: a small signpost pointing backwards. If participants selected this option, they were 
taken back to the original stimulus screen but lost two coins (in order to view the stimulus again) 
and experienced another delay of 5 seconds of the figure running. After this, they were presented 
with the same response options as before. If they responded correctly after having used the back 
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option, they receive the three remaining coins.  If they answered incorrectly they received zero 
coins. To keep the participants motivated, the coin count was shown at the top of the screen and 
the entire experimental task was presented in the form of a game. 
Three indicators were selected as measures of metamemory ability from the delayed-
match-to-sample task. First, drawing from the comparative cognition literature, the overall 
number of trials when the animals in those studies chose to go back (or have another look, or 
“escape” and make no decision) has been considered an indicator of metamemory (denoting 
hesitation, and thus possible awareness of their memory when choosing responses). For this 
study, the first measure of metamemory from the task was the number of times the participants 
chose to go back and look at the original stimulus. In line with previous research, this was 
assumed to be a measure of uncertainty, incorporating hesitation and awareness of memory.  
Secondly, the percentage of responses that the participant was able to identify correctly 
after having gone back was also an indicator of metamemory. For the validation of this new 
measure, the percentage of correct responses after having gone back was compared to the verbal 
metamemory inventory. One part of the MMI involves asking participants to estimate how many 
items (simple words) out of 16 they will remember. This portion of the measure asked 
participants to make an ease of learning judgement; according to Smith and colleagues (2003), a 
similar demand was being made of animals during the DMTS task (like the one used in this 
study) when they choose to go back at a cost (i.e. they are deciding how likely they are to learn 
the information upon reviewing it). Therefore, the percentage of responses that the participant 
was able to identify correctly after having gone back allowed for the examination of a type of 
metamemory that more closely approximates the behavioral aspects of the MMI (NB: the 
complete MMI used in this analysis also uses other, non-behavioral items). 
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The final measure of metamemory that was derived from this task is similar to the 
percentage of correct responses after going back: the improvement in memory due to having 
looked at the original stimulus again. The percentage of times where the participant went back 
and chose the correct answer after initially (on the same trial) having chosen an incorrect answer 
was considered (during the DMTS an answer was chosen before the participant was allowed to 
choose the option to go back). This allows a functional indicator of the benefit of having gone 
back to be calculated. This indicator is called improvement in recall.   
Procedure 
 Participants were recruited through an undergraduate research pool at York University. 
Participants received partial course credit for their participation. Consent was obtained from the 
participant after the general structure of the study was explained to them. Each participant 
completed the WASI, the EOWPVT, the AQ the MMQ and the MMI in that order. After this, the 
experimenter informed the participant that the next stage required them to complete a task whose 
objective will become evident. They were told not to ask any questions regarding the task, and 
that the task would be completed on a computer.  
The participants then began the DMTS task. Initially there were three training trials to 
acquaint participants with the task. In the first two training trials, participants were free to choose 
the correct matching response. If they chose an incorrect option, the correct option was 
highlighted (with a brief flash). For these two initial training trials, the escape option was not 
present. Then, in the third training trial, regardless of the answer the participant chose, the back 
option (on a signpost) was highlighted by a brief flash in order to acquaint participants with the 
function of that option. They were then taken back to the stimulus and experienced another 
delay, this time for 5 seconds. After these three training trials, they began the testing trials. There  
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Figure 1: Panels from the DMTS task. Top-left panel depicts the small figure at the original 
stimulus with coins in hand. Top-right panel shows the figuring running during the delay period. 
Bottom panel shows the figure “looking” at a different set of response stimuli. At the top of the 
bottom panel is a counter keeping track of coins. To the right of the image is a garbage can, into 
which the coins go if an incorrect choice is made.  
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were 48 testing trails (divided equally among 2, 15 and 25 second delays and sets of 4 and 8 
stimuli). Both the variation in time and in the number of stimulus choices affected the difficulty 
of the task. However, the added benefit of varying the stimulus sets also helped to ensure that 
associations are not made solely between the length of the delay, and choosing to re-look at the 
stimulus. 
Participants were awarded five coins for a correct reply without going back, three coins 
for a correct reply after using the back option and zero coins for an incorrect response in either 
case. As they were received, the coins filled a counter at the top of the screen that kept a count of 
the coins received up till that point. The counter indicated  “x/250 coins”, suggesting that the 
game would be over when they received 250 coins. This was to motivate participants to provide 
the correct answer. Regardless of their response, however, they finished the task after 48 trials. 
After the task was completed, participants were debriefed and told the purpose of the study. The 
procedure lasted between 1.5 and 2 hours in its entirety.    
Results 
 
Age was not correlated with any of the main memory or metamemory measures. 
Similarly, there were no sex differences among any of the memory or metamemory measures. 
Males were likely to score higher on the Autism Spectrum Quotient than females (t(41) = 2.11, p 
= 0.04) as is consistent with other studies (Baron-Cohen et al., 2002).  
Task characteristics  
The average number of matches the participant made correctly to the original stimuli was 
32.35 (SD = 4.30) out of the 48 total trials. Participants took an average of 8.30 seconds to make 
a choice (SD = 2.65). The preceding means and standard deviations pertain to the time and 
accuracy of the choice participants made initially, that is before going back and re-looking at the 
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original stimulus. Participants had the option once per trial, after having chosen a response from 
the response set, to choose to go back and view the original stimulus after which they could then 
make another (or the same) choice. The average number of times the participants went back was 
8.58 (SD = 6.40) out of the 48 total trials, representing 17.88% of the trials.  
Table 1 and Table 2 summarize the means and standard deviations of each condition in 
terms of average time to make the initial response, the number of correct responses the first time 
on each trial, and the number of times the participants went back to look at the original stimuli.  
Table 1  
 
Means and standard deviations of the average time in seconds to make a response, the number of 
correct responses, and the number of times participants chose to go back and look at the original 
stimulus at each level of delay time. 
 2 seconds 15 seconds 25 seconds 
Average time (seconds) 7.28(2.08)* 8.67(2.54) 8.96(3.00) 
# of correct responses 12.44(2.22)* 11.00(2.18)a 8.91(1.78) 
# of times participants 
went back 
2.56(2.02)* 3.00(2.60) 3.02(2.70) 
*  = significantly different from the 15 and 25 second conditions 
a  = significantly different from the 25 second condition 
 
Table 2 
 
Means and standard deviations of the average time in seconds to make a response, the number of 
correct responses, and the number of times participants chose to go back and look at the original 
stimulus in the 4 and 8 stimuli conditions.  
 4 stimuli 8 stimuli 
Average time (seconds) 7.56(1.97)* 9.41(2.61) 
# of correct responses 17.70(2.72)* 14.67(2.73) 
# of times participants went 
back 
4.17(3.17) 4.41(3.34) 
* = significantly different from the 8 stimuli condition 
 
An initial MANOVA examined the time conditions and the number of response options 
as covariates for each of the three of dependent variables (average time to respond, number of 
correct responses and number of times the participants went back). The MANOVA revealed a 
non-significant interaction between the time conditions and the number of response set options 
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(F(5,37) = 1.82, p = 0.13). However, each of the conditions were significant for each dependent 
variable; follow up univariate tests were conducted. 
A series of repeated measures ANOVA tests were conducted to examine differences 
among the different time conditions (2, 15 or 25 seconds) for average response time for each 
condition, the number of correct answers, and the number of times the participants chose to go 
back. A repeated measures ANOVA revealed an effect of time condition for average response 
time (F(1,42) = 19.51, p < 0.001). Pairwise t-tests revealed the average response time in the 2s 
condition was lower than in both the 15s and 25s conditions (t(42) = 3.65, p < 0.001; t(42) = 
4.42, p < 0.001). No differences were found for average response time between the 15s and 25s 
group (p = 0.37; see Fig. 2).  
A repeated measures ANOVA revealed an effect of time condition for the number of 
correct responses (F(1,42) = 75.05, p < 0.001). Pairwise comparisons revealed that the average 
numbers of correct responses in the 2s condition were higher than the average number of correct 
responses in both the 15s and 25s conditions (t(42) = 3.53, p < 0.001 and t(42) = 8.66, p < 0.001 
respectively). The 15s condition also had more correct responses than the 25s condition (t(42) = 
5.72, p < 0.001; see Fig. 3). 
Finally, a repeated measures ANOVA also revealed an effect of time condition for the 
number of times the back option was selected (F(1,42) = 18.89, p < 0.001). Pairwise 
comparisons revealed that number of times the participant chose to go back in the 2s condition 
was lower than the number in the 15s condition (t(42) = 2.09, p = 0.04) but was not significant 
compared with the 25s group (t(42) = 1.75, p = 0.09). There was no difference between the 15s 
and 25s group (p = 0.92; see Fig 4). 
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Figure 2: Average time taken for participants to select their response from the response stimuli 
based on the delay trial condition. Standard error bars are shown. 
* denotes significance at p = 0.05 level for all the above graphs 
 
 
Figure 3: Average number of correct responses selected by the participant in each condition. 
Standard error bars are shown. 
* denotes significance at p = 0.05 level for all the above graphs 
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Figure 4: Average number of times the participants chose to go back and look at the original 
stimulus in each condition. Standard error bars are shown.  
* denotes significance at p = 0.05 level for all the above graphs 
 
 
 
 
Figure 5: Average time taken for participant to select their response from the response stimuli 
based on the number of response options. Standard error bars are shown. 
* denotes significance at p = 0.05 level 
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Figure 6: Average number of correct responses selected by the participant with each number of 
response options. Standard error bars are shown.  
* denotes significance at p = 0.05 level  
 
 
 
 
Figure 7: Average number of times the participants chose to go back and look at the original 
stimulus by the number of response options. Standard error bars are shown. 
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Paired sample t-tests were also conducted to look at differences between participant 
responses (again, the average response time, the number of correct responses and number of  
times the participant chose to go back) in the 4 stimuli and 8 stimuli conditions. A t-test revealed 
a significant difference between the 4 and 8 stimuli conditions for both response time (t(42) = 
7.55, p < 0.001; Fig. 5) and number of correct responses (t(42) = 5.95, p < 0.001; Fig 6). 
However, there was no difference in the amount of times participants chose to go back to look at 
the original stimulus in the two conditions (p = 0.40; Fig 7). 
Validity of the DMTS task 
 Three indicators of metamemory (described in detail beginning on page 15) were used 
from the DMTS task to examine metamemory. The first was the number of times the participant 
chose to go back. Second, after having gone back, the percentage of correct answers was 
considered. Finally, the number of times the participant’s answer improved (i.e. their answer 
choice went from incorrect to correct) was considered.  
The total number of times the participant chose to go back was correlated with the 
participant’s responses on the MMI (r = 0.45, p < 0.01; see Fig. 4) and approached significance 
with the MMQ (r = 0.27, p = 0.08). For both the MMI and the MMQ, higher scores reflect more 
awareness of their memory (or self-reported awareness in the case of the MMQ). The MMI and 
the MMQ were not significantly correlated with each other (r = 0.28, p = 0.07). The percentage 
of correct responses after going back was significantly correlated with the MMI (r = .55, p < 
0.001), but not with the MMQ (r = 0.23, p = 0.14). Similarly, improvement in recall was 
correlated with the MMI (r = .52, p < 0.001) and again not with the MMQ (r = 0.25, p = 0.11). 
Correlations with the total number of correct responses the participant made initially, called 
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initial memory (i.e. before going back, as a measure of total memory ability, not metamemory) 
are provided in Table 3 below.  
 
Table 3  
Correlations between measures of metamemory and memory.  
 MMI MMQ # of times 
participant 
went back 
% of correct 
responses 
after back 
Improvement 
in recall 
Initial 
memory 
(correct 
responses) 
MMI 1 0.28 0.45** 0.55** 0.52** -0.07 
MMQ  1 0.27a 0.23 0.25 -0.09 
# of times 
participant 
went back 
  1 0.34* 0.45* -0.01 
% of correct 
responses 
after back 
   1 0.83** 0.01 
Improvement 
in recall 
    1 0.02 
Initial 
memory 
(correct 
responses) 
     1 
* = signicant at 0.05 level 
** = significant at 0.01 level 
 
Autism Spectrum Quotient  
The short form of the Autism Spectrum Quotient (AQ) was used to assess autism-like traits in 
the sample. The short form of the AQ has been effective in screening for autism (Allison, 
Auyeung, & Baron-Cohen, 2012). Higher scores on the AQ reflect the presence of more autism-
like traits. The average score for this sample on the 10-item scale was 3.70 (SD = 1.47) with five 
participants meeting the criterion for further testing for ASD (criterion identified by the authors  
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Figure 8: Scatterplot depicting the relationship between the number of times participants chose 
to go back and view the original stimulus compared with their MMI score.  
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was a score greater than six; that is, participants who endorsed six or more of the 10 items). The 
number of times the participant went back, the percentage of correct responses afterwards and 
improvement in recall were not correlated with the AQ (r = 0.12, p = 0.26; r = 0.22, p = 0.18; r = 
0.11, p = 0.50). The MMQ and the AQ were not correlated either (r = -0.07, p = 0.67).  The MMI 
however, did have a significant correlation with the AQ (r = -0.31, p = 0.04). That is, the higher 
the AQ score (more autism-like traits), the lower the MMI score (weaker metamemory abilities).  
Table 4  
Correlations of the metamemory measures with the Autism Spectrum Quotient. 
 MMI MMQ % of correct 
responses after 
back 
# of times 
participant 
went back 
Improvement 
in recall 
Correlation 
with AQ 
-0.31 -0.07 0.22 0.18 0.11 
Sig. 2-tailed 0.04 0.64 0.18 0.26 0.50 
 
WASI subscales, FSIQ-2, and Expressive Vocabulary  
In order to determine whether IQ and expressive vocabulary were not affecting 
metamemory on all the different measures (or vice-versa), the subtests from the Weschler 
Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence – Second Edition (WASI-II) and the Expressive One Word 
Picture Vocabulary Test – 4th Edition (EOWPVT) were given to the participants. Average scores 
of the full scale intelligence quotient derived from the two subscales (FSIQ-2) was 102.63 (SD = 
10.99). None of the metamemory measures, including the indicators derived from the DMTS 
task, were correlated with any of the Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning or FSIQ-2 from the WASI-2 
or the expressive vocabulary score from the EOWPVT. The Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning 
subscales were not correlated with each other. The EOWPVT score was correlated with 
Vocabulary, Matrix Reasoning and FSIQ-2 (r = 0.59, 0.49 and 0.68, all p < 0.001). The 
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relationship between the total number of correct responses initially made (referred to as initial 
memory) and Matrix Reasoning approached significance (r = 0.23, p = 0.055).  
Table 5  
 
Correlations of metamemory and intelligence and vocabulary measures.  
 # of times 
participant 
went back 
WASI - 
Vocabulary 
WASI – 
Matrix 
Reasoning 
WASI- 
FSIQ-2  
EOWPV
T 
Initial 
Memory 
(correct 
responses)  
# of times 
participant 
went back 
1 -0.04 -0.17 -0.16 -0.11 -0.01 
WASI - 
Vocabulary 
 1 0.23 0.79** 0.59** 0.03 
WASI – 
Matrix 
Reasoning 
  1 0.77** 0.49** 0.30 
WASI-  
FSIQ-2 
   1 0.68** -0.05 
EOWPVT     1 0.21 
Initial 
Memory 
(correct 
responses) 
     1 
* = signicant at 0.05 level 
** = significant at 0.01 level 
 
Discussion 
 
 The primary goal for this study was to develop a measure of metamemory that does not 
rely on language. A delayed match to sample task (DMTS) was used, similar to ones developed 
in the animal literature (e.g. Goto & Watanabe, 2002). Participants were allowed to choose to go 
back and look at the original stimulus after looking at the response set at the cost of virtual coins 
(which were used as an in-task reward). Participants were not given any verbal instructions about 
the task before completing the DMTS task in this study; instead the first three trials were training 
trials where participants were allowed to become familiar with the task.   
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The task was constructed in order to have a mixture of easy and difficult items. To 
systematically adjust the difficulty, the initial delay after stimulus presentation was varied (there 
was either a 2, 15, or 25 second delay). As well, the number of response options from which the 
participant was asked to select the original stimulus was varied (there were either four or eight 
options). The 15 and 25 second conditions both proved to be more difficult than the 2 second 
condition indicated by the average amount of time participants took to make a choice, the 
number of correct responses participants made, as well as the number of times participants chose 
to go back and look at the original stimulus. Participants had the most incorrect responses in the 
25 second condition, but among the other measures of difficulty (time to choose a response and 
the number of times they chose to go back), there was no significant difference between the 25 
and 15 second conditions. A similar pattern was observed in the four vs. eight response stimuli 
conditions, where participants had the greatest number of correct responses and made their 
choices quicker in the four response stimuli condition compared to eight stimuli condition. 
Generally, this pattern of results shows that DMTS task was functioning as intended, and 
the measures taken to vary the difficulty of the task were effective. However, differences 
between the 15 and 25 second conditions were not always observed. Much working memory 
literature suggests that the amount of time that people are able to hold information without 
rehearsal (or other strategies) is between 10-15 seconds (Portrat, Barrouillet & Camos, 2008; 
Luck & Vogel, 2013). Once the delay exceeded the usual assumed limit for working memory, 
memory performance was not affected by any more delay (i.e. 10-15 seconds additional delay 
time does not seem to increase the difficulty of the task).  
There were no significant interactions between the delay length (2, 15, or 25 seconds) and 
the number of response stimuli (4 or 8 stimuli) for any of the difficulty measures (which were 
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“time to make first response”, “number of correct responses” and “times the participant went 
back”). This indicates that the combination of longer delay and greater number of response 
stimuli did not significantly increase the difficulty of the test beyond the individual effects of 
each. Overall, the task’s characteristics are an appropriate reflection of the tasks seen in animal 
(Sutton & Shettleworth, 2008) and human literature (Amit, Yakovlev & Hochstein, 2013).    
Validity  
The validity of the DMTS task can be examined in several ways. Immediately apparent is 
the face validity. In the DMTS task, participants have to make a choice that allows them to 
choose to go back and look at the original stimulus or not. At the very least, the task is directly 
measuring the uncertainty of the participant in the response that they have selected. As long as 
participants are sufficiently motivated to complete the task well, they must access their 
metamemory and make judgments about whether they should continue with their answer or not.  
Evidence for the convergent validity of the task with existing measures was also queried 
using the Metamemory Inventory (MMI) and the Multifactorial Memory Questionnaire (MMQ). 
In the MMI, participants answer questions that demonstrate their metamemory (e.g. by asking 
them to predict how many words from a set they will remember), while the MMQ requires 
participants to identify how strong they believe their metamemory is, through self-report on a 
Likert scale. Research comparing self-report measures and more behaviorally guided measures 
have shown weak or modest correlations in many domains (e.g. with ADHD, cf. Toplak, West, 
& Stanovich, 2013; with schizophrenia, cf. Elliott & Fiszdon, 2014; everyday functioning, cf. 
Schmitter-Edgecombe, Parsey, & Cook, 2011). In order to examine whether the self-report 
measures and the more behaviorally based measures would follow the same pattern seen in other 
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cognitive areas, the relationship between the MMI and the MMQ was examined. The MMI and 
MMQ had a weak correlation with each other (r = 0.28) that was not significant.  
The current DMTS task provides many different methods to assess metamemory, and the 
goal of this study was to provide a simple and effective way of doing this. The number of times 
the participant chose to go back to look at the original stimulus was chosen as the primary 
indicator of metamemory. Comparative cognition studies have used this to indicate how often 
animals experienced a state of uncertainty (e.g. Goto & Watanabe, 2002; Basile et al., 2015), in 
which the choice to go back (and having to experience some delay again) is assumed to be more 
desirable than choosing an answer at the cost of some reward.  
Using this measure of metamemory, a score comprised of the number of times each 
participant chose to go back was assigned. The measure was significantly correlated with the 
MMI (r = 0.45) but the correlation with the MMQ was not significant (r = 0.27). Consistent with 
the correlation between the two validation measures, the behavioral assessment of metamemory 
given by this task was moderately correlated with the MMI, which is a combined questionnaire 
and behavioural measure, but did not share a significant correlation with the self-report score 
given by the MMQ. As mentioned earlier, this likely reflects the common lack of agreement 
found between behavioral measures when compared with self-report.  
A second indicator of metamemory, the percentage of responses the participant answered 
correctly after going back, was significantly correlated with the MMI (r = 0.55). The rationale for 
this indicator was described earlier. In summary, different types of metamemory have been 
reported. The number of times the participant chooses to go back in the DMTS task has been 
conceptualized as an uncertainty judgement (Smith et al., 2013). In contrast, some questions of 
MMI require the participant to make an ease of learning judgement; that is, to reflect on how 
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likely they are to learn a specified number of words from the list. In order to find an analogous 
measure in the DTMS task, I examined the percentage of times the participant made the correct 
response after going back. Participants who were most likely to go back in hopes they would 
then be able to identify the correct response would receive the highest scores on this measure if 
they were able to correctly assess their ease of learning.  
The final indicator of metamemory derived from the DMTS task in this study was the 
improvement in recall. The function of metacognitive abilities is to improve cognition and the 
percentage of times memory recall was improved as a result of looking at the original stimulus 
again was calculated, and associations with the other metamemory measures were examined. 
Improvement in recall was significantly correlated with the MMI (r = 0.52). The significant 
correlations of the percentage of correct responses after going back, and improvement in recall 
with the MMI, lend evidence to the validity of the DMTS task as a behavioral measure of 
metamemory that does not rely on language. While correlations with the MMQ are generally 
non-significant, the discrepancy between self-report measures and behavioral measures are 
common (e.g. Elliot & Fiszdon, 2014).  
The Autism Spectrum Quotient 
 Relationships with the AQ were also examined. Previous studies looking at metamemory 
in autism have found a deficit when not matching for verbal ability (Wojcik et al., 2013; 
Grainger et al., 2014). In contrast, when studies control for verbal ability, the evidence is mixed 
(Farrant, 1999). Bebko and colleagues (2015) have previously suggested that when assessing for 
improvements in metamemory, current instruments rely heavily on language and are likely to 
underrepresent the abilities of children on the autism spectrum. For this reason, this study 
included the AQ as a measure of autism-like traits in the general population. The MMI was 
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found to have a small but significant negative correlation with the AQ (r = -0.31). All three 
indicators of metamemory given by the DMTS task were not significantly correlated with the 
AQ (r = 0.11 - 0.22). The MMQ was also not correlated with the AQ (r = -0.07).  
 The negative correlation with the MMI suggests that people with more autism-like traits 
may struggle with a verbal, behavioral task assessing metamemory. It is important to note that 
this was a sample of typically developing university students; a clinical sample with autism may 
have an even lower correlation on tasks similar to the MMI. On the other hand, there were only 
small, non-significant correlations with the DMTS and the MMQ. Since the MMQ is a self-
report measure, when trying to measure improvements in metamemory after intervention or 
training, the MMQ is unlikely to be of objective use. The evidence for the validity of the DMTS, 
along with the lack of relation between the measure and autism-like traits, makes it a strong 
candidate for use when delineating the growth or improvement of metamemory apart from 
language.  
Intelligence and Expressive Vocabulary 
 IQ, as measured by the WASI-II, and expressive vocabulary, on the EOWPVT, were 
used to determine whether they would have some relation to the various measures. The 
EOWPVT and the Vocabulary subtest on the WASI-II were significantly correlated with one 
another (r = 0.59). Since they were both measures of language based skills, this was expected. 
None of the metamemory measures, including the DMTS were correlated with either IQ or 
expressive vocabulary. It was likely that the lack of wide variability in IQ and language ability in 
the university sample used for the study contributed to the lack of correlations. If there was a 
more significant amount of variability in the IQ or expressive language ability, differences may 
be observed. Further, all participants were over 18 years old. A child’s developing brain shows 
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much variability relative to their peers in language development (Huttenlocher, Waterfall, 
Vasilyeva, Vevea, & Hedges, 2010) and different relationships between language dependent tests 
of metamemory and nonverbal tests of metamemory with IQ or language skills may be observed 
in those populations.  
Memory 
 While it was not focal to this research, a total memory score was also able to be 
calculated through the DMTS task. In this task, participants would have to select a response and 
then choose if they wanted to go back or continue with their choice. This first response was 
either correct or incorrect and was recorded by the program as well. Participants’ original 
responses were recorded even when they chose to go back and look at the original stimulus. 
Their total number of correct initial responses, or total memory, on this visual memory task was 
not correlated with any of the measures of metamemory (e.g. r = -0.01 with the number of times 
the participant chose to go back). Metamemory serves many functions for participants 
independent of overall memory ability (Short, Schatschneider, & Friebert, 1993; Cavanaugh & 
Perlmutter, 1982). For example, someone with a poor overall memory may use strategies 
effectively to compensate for deficits in their memory, demonstrating strong metamemory 
ability. Conversely, participants may also have a strong memory and have relatively little need to 
supplement their memory with effective strategies. On this task, someone who is unlikely to 
remember many visual images may choose to go back often, correctly reflecting their lack of 
knowledge as to what the correct answer is. Alternatively, someone with poor visual memory 
skills may rarely choose to go back, and thus demonstrate issues with metamemory in addition to 
memory. Given further variability in a broader sample, differences in memory ability may be 
associated with IQ as well because of the link between perceptual reasoning and visual memory. 
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In this study, IQ was not related to total memory. The Matrix Reasoning subtest of the WASI 
was not correlated with IQ (r = 0.30). Other tasks of visual memory have been associated with 
perceptual reasoning tasks (Jiang, Lee & Asaad, 2016), indicating an ability to detect patterns 
quickly may assist in remembering useful pieces of information in visual memory tasks.  
Future Directions and Limitations 
 In summary, the pattern of findings in this study suggests that metamemory can be 
measured nonverbally. While there are correlations with verbal measures, the type of 
metamemory being assessed must be considered as well (uncertainty judgements, ease of 
learning judgements, etc.). In addition, the weak to moderate correlation suggests that there may 
be other components of metamemory that are uniquely associated with the nonverbal 
metamemory measure. Still, the nonverbal DMTS task outlined in this study seems to be a strong 
indicator of metamemory, robust against the influence of other traits present in the broader 
autism phenotype.  
 However, given the lack of variability in the task in terms of the language ability and IQ 
of the participants, it is difficult to know what relation, if any, there is among these variables and 
metamemory. One hypothesis of the study was that verbal measures like the MMI are associated 
with language and/or IQ measures, and that this could result in an important confound when 
studying clinical populations such as autism that have associated deficits in language or 
cognitive ability (for a summary, see Leekam, 2007). It is difficult to know if these relationships 
exist; given the lack of variability found in language ability and IQ in this study, no evidence of 
this relationship was found. Furthermore, language is a complicated construct and this study did 
not take into account other aspects of language (such as semantics).  
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The original inspiration for the study and the DMTS task came from the autism literature. 
This study lends to the evidence for the validity of the task as a measure of metamemory. It also 
raises some warnings that the traits found in autism may have an impact on verbal measures of 
metamemory, which are not necessarily found in the nonverbal task outlined in this study. 
Specifically, since the MMI was negatively correlated with the AQ, it may be the people with 
some of the traits found in the broader autism phenotype have a difficult time answering the 
(verbal) questions that ask them to posit a future mind state (i.e. how many words they will learn 
or which set of items will be easier to remember). This difficulty does not seem to persist in the 
nonverbal task.  
Future studies looking at levels of metamemory in autism should endeavor to use a 
nonverbal approach in order to limit the effects of language impairment and determine true 
metamemory deficits. The evidence of a metamemory deficit in autism is equivocal (e.g. 
Grainger et al., 2014; Farrant, 1999) and a task similar to the one outlined here can help to 
separate language and metamemory abilities. Language and metamemory ability are known to be 
linked in development (Cantor et al., 1985; Harris, 2000) and a method of studying metamemory 
independent of language ability can help elucidate its developmental trajectory. Some evidence 
shows that language development precedes metamemory in young children but studies have 
traditionally needed to rely on questionnaires and other verbal methods of eliciting this 
information (e.g. Ebert, 2015).  
Further, many studies have targeted memory in autism (Chan, Han, Sze & Lau, 2015; 
O’Hearn, Schroer, Minshew & Luna, 2010). There is evidence that children with ASD have 
difficulty using memory strategies (Maister, Simons & Plaisted-Grant, 2013; Bebko et al., 2015; 
Bebko, Dahary, Goldstein, Porthukaran & Ferland, in prep). Recently, researchers have tried to 
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encourage children with ASD to utilize memory strategies with success (Bebko et al., 2015). 
However, even when spontaneously using strategies they were not using before, these children 
do not demonstrate any change in their metamemory ability. Because of the measures assessing 
metamemory in these studies, it is difficult to know whether children with ASD do not show 
improvements because of language difficulties. The research described here indicates that a 
nonverbal approach in studying their ability might be more reflective of their skills compared 
with the verbal approaches that were previously available. Changes occur in their awareness of 
their memory and the knowledge of when to use learned skills, and the DMTS task allows us an 
opportunity to measure this.  
There are several limitations of this study, some of which are common to many studies of 
metacognition. A task asking participants to go back and look at the original stimulus assumes 
that the reason the participant chose to do this is because they were uncertain about their 
response. Positing their mental state is problematic. Converging evidence with other indicators of 
metamemory lends some evidence to the assertion; however, in future studies, researchers should 
ask participants to identify the reasons for which they chose to go back. Similarly, participant 
feedback about what they thought about their chances of later selecting a correct answer when 
they choose to go back can provide us with information about whether they were making ease of 
learning judgements. However, some evidence indicates that people may choose to make 
decisions based on general feelings of uncertainty, which these participants have not directly 
self-identified as related to metamemory (Han, Li & Liu, 2003). Future studies must take into 
consideration participant responses very carefully.  
There are different types of metamemory as mentioned in the study, and care must be 
taken when comparing tasks across these functions. Evidence that types of metamemory 
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converge is present (Smith et al., 2003) and the results of this study lend some further evidence 
to this conclusion. However, tasks that assess a variety of responses that investigate metamemory 
may be necessary to explicate the full nature of these abilities.  
Finally, the sample used in this study consisted of a narrow range of participants in terms 
of age and IQ. Other research has demonstrated that typically studies using university samples 
have socioeconomic status, education, and other factors that do not reflect the population in 
general (Delice, 2010). In the study of the development of metamemory and its relation to 
variables such as language, a more diverse sample will likely lead to additionally informative 
data.  
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Appendix A  
 
Metamemory Inventory  
 
Is one of these groups easier to remember? If yes, which one? 
 
Why? 
 
Is one of these groups easier to remember? If yes, which one? 
 
Why? 
 
 
I am going to read to you a list of 16 words. At the end, I’ll ask you to try and remember as many 
words as you can. You don’t need to say them in order. How many words do you think you’ll 
remember? 
 
1 time  
2 year 
3 man 
4 life 
5 child 
6 way 
7 state 
8 group 
9 hand 
10 part 
11 room 
12 book 
13 eye 
14 job 
15 kind 
16 name 
 
Now tell me as many as you remember. 
 
 
 
 
Did you use any particular strategy to remember the words?  
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Were there any words you hadn’t heard before? 
 
 
What would you do if you had to remember something difficult?  
 
MMQ 
 
Participants were asked to rate the following items on the point scale given below: 
 
Strongly Agree  Agree  Undecided  Disagree    Strongly Disagree 
 
 
How I Feel About My Memory 
 
Below are statements about feelings that people may have about their memory. Read each 
statement and think about your feelings over the past two weeks. Then, check the box next to the 
response that best describes how much you agree or disagree. 
 
1. I am generally pleased with my memory ability. 
 
2. There is something seriously wrong with my memory. 
 
3. If something is important, I will probably remember it. 
  
4. When I forget something, I fear that I may have a serious memory problem, like Alzheimer’s 
disease. 
  
5. My memory is worse than most other people my age.  
 
6. I have confidence in my ability to remember things. 
  
7. I feel unhappy when I think about my memory ability. 
     
8. I worry that others will notice that my memory is not very good.   
    
9. When I have trouble remembering something, I’m not too hard on myself. 
 
10.I am concerned about my memory. 
 
11.My memory is really going downhill lately. 
 
12.I am generally satisfied with my memory ability.   
   
13.I don’t get upset when I have trouble remembering something. 
 
14.I worry that I will forget something important. 
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15.I am embarrassed about my memory ability. 
 
16.I get annoyed or irritated with myself when I am forgetful. 
  
17.My memory is good for my age. 
  
18.I worry about my memory ability. 
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Appendix B 
Nonverbal Assessment of Metamemory – Consent Form 
 
James Bebko             
PhD – Professor 
Clinical Developmental Psychology 
 
 
Alex Porthukaran 
Masters’ Candidate 
Clinical Developmental Psychology 
 
Purpose of the research:  
The purpose of this study is to measure metamemory (the awareness and understanding of one’s own 
memory) nonverbally using an experimental measure and to compare these to measures of intelligence, 
verbal ability and autism-like traits. This research will ask give us further understanding on how 
metamemory relates to language.  
What you will be asked to do in the research:  
Participants will be required to complete standardized measures of IQ and verbal ability. During these, an 
experimenter will ask you questions, have you form shapes with blocks and choose the correct answer 
from a set of responses. Then you will complete a questionnaire about memory. After this, you will be 
asked to play a game where the purpose is to collect enough coins to finish the task. The game will be 
simple and ask you to look at a stimulus and try and remember it. The entirety of the task should take less 
than 2 hours to complete with a break in the middle. For these 2 hours, you will receive 2 credits towards 
your PSYC 1010 class.  
Risks and discomforts:  
There are no risks associated with the study. However, the testing process might be long. For this reason, 
the experimental task in the second part of the study was designed to be played like a game.   
Benefits of the research and benefits to you:  
This research is novel and may help us to gain a deeper understanding of metamemory and how it relates 
to language and other important psychological constructs. Participating in this study also gives you some 
exposure into important psychological measures and a glimpse into how research is performed.   
Voluntary participation:  
Your participation in the research is completely voluntary and that participants may choose to stop 
participating at any time. Your decision not to continue participating will not influence their relationship 
or the nature of their relationship with researchers or with staff of York University either now or in the 
future.  
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Withdrawal from the study:  
You may stop participating in the study at any time, for any reason, if you so decide. Your decision to 
stop participating, or to refuse to answer particular questions, will not affect your relationship with the 
researchers, York University, or any other group associated with this project. In the event that you 
withdraw from the study, all associated data collected will be immediately destroyed wherever possible. 
Even if you decide to withdraw, you will still receive your course credit for the PSYC 1010 class for 
agreeing to take part in the research project.  
Confidentiality: 
All data with identifying information will be replaced with an arbitrary code number to maintain 
confidentiality. No identifying information will ever be made public. Your responses to the tasks in this 
study will only be seen by members of this research team and will be stored in a sealed cabinet or on a 
password protected computer. Any research published will use group trends instead of individual data. 
Confidentiality will be provided to the fullest extent possible by law. Data and audio-video recordings 
will be stored for an extended period after the study to enable comparison and combination with data in 
future studies. Once all projects in this line of research have been completed, all data and recordings will 
be destroyed (paper materials will be shredded and video will be destroyed).  
If you have any questions about the research study or your role in this study, please contact either of the 
researchers listed above (the supervisor is Dr. James Bebko: xxxxxxxxx, the student researcher is Alex 
Porthukaran: xxxxxxxxx). You may also contact the graduate office (xxxxxxxxxx).  
This research has been reviewed and approved by the Human Participants Review Sub-Committee, 
York University’s Ethics Review Board and conforms to the standards of the Canadian Tri-Council 
Research Ethics guidelines. If you have any questions about this process, or about your rights as a 
participant in the study, you may contact the Senior Manager and Policy Advisor for the Office of 
Research Ethics, 5th floor, York Research Tower, York University.  Telephone: xxxxxxxxx or email: 
xxxxxxxxxxx 
If you agree to participate in this study please complete the following: 
“I _____________________________ consent to participate in the Nonverbal Assessment of 
Metamemory project conducted by Dr. James Bebko. I have understood the nature of this project and 
wish to participate. I am not waiving any of my legal rights by signing this form. My signature below 
indicates my consent. 
 
____________________________     _____________________ 
Signature                    Date 
 
 
